Open the Users screen of almost any WordPress site that is a few years old, and you will meet people nobody remembers. A designer who left in 2019. An agency the owner stopped paying long ago. An account called "test" with administrator rights. Each one is a key to your website, and most owners have no idea how many keys are out there.
This article explains why user accounts became one of the most common ways into WordPress sites this year, which accounts you are most likely to find, and how to clean them up in about an hour.
What This Year's Attacks Have in Common
Most WordPress attacks this year did not guess passwords. They used a flaw in a plugin to create a new administrator account, or to take over an existing one. Once attackers have an admin account, they can install anything, and they often hide that account so the owner never sees it.
Patchstack's yearly security report, published in March, shows how central this is. Of the WordPress flaws that attackers actually used, 57% were broken access control, which means a plugin let someone do things their role should not allow. Another 20% were privilege escalation, where a visitor or a low-level user becomes an administrator. The typical flaw was attacked within 5 hours of becoming public.
The cases below all happened in the last ten months. Each one ended with an attacker holding an administrator account.
| When | What happened | How many sites | Effect on user accounts |
|---|---|---|---|
| January | A flaw in the Modular DS plugin let anyone log in as an admin without a password | More than 40,000 | Attackers created new admin users |
| June | The Kirki plugin let anyone reset any user's password with one request | More than 500,000 | Attackers took over existing admin accounts |
| August | Seven BdThemes add-ons for Elementor received a poisoned update | About 350,000 | Hidden admin accounts starting with "bd_" were created |
| September | Wordfence reported malware that hides its own admin accounts | Not reported | Admins named "admin_", "adm_" or "backup_" plus six random characters |
The last two rows matter most for an audit. In both cases, the attacker's account did not show up on the normal Users screen. The September malware even hid itself from the admin count at the top of that screen. So a quick look at the dashboard is not enough anymore.
The human side is just as important. The Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, released in May, found that a third party such as a supplier or partner was involved in 48% of breaches. For a small business website, the third party is often the old web developer, the SEO freelancer or the agency that built the site.
The Five Accounts You Will Probably Find
The WordPress roles are simple. The problem is that people get more access than they need, and nobody takes it back when the work ends. The table below shows what each default role can do and who should normally have it.
| Role | What it can do | Who should usually have it |
|---|---|---|
| Administrator | Everything, including plugins, themes, users and settings | One or two owners and your main support provider |
| Editor | Publish and edit all posts and pages, including other people's | Your content or marketing lead |
| Author | Publish and edit their own posts | Regular writers |
| Contributor | Write posts but not publish them | Guest writers and new team members |
| Subscriber | Manage their own profile only | Customers and members |
With that in mind, these are the accounts that come up again and again when we audit sites.
The former team member. Someone left the company, but their account stayed. Their email may now belong to nobody, which means anyone who gets that email address can reset the password.
The old developer or agency. The site was built three years ago, and the builder still has an administrator account "just in case". Some still log in. Most do not even remember the password, which is worse, because a forgotten password is never changed.
The generic "admin" account. Usernames like admin, test, demo or the business name are the first ones attackers try. The Kirki attack above worked by requesting a password reset for a known username such as admin.
The account nobody can explain. One security team described a client who found an administrator called "wpmaint". Nobody had created it, and even after a full review they could not prove where it came from. It may have been a forgotten maintenance login, a leftover from a migration or something worse. When you cannot name the person behind an account, treat it as a risk.
The hidden account. This is the attacker's account that does not show on the Users screen. You can only find it by looking at the database directly, as explained below.
Not sure who can log in to your website? Our WordPress maintenance team checks every user account at database level, removes what should not be there and sets up safer access for the people who need it.
How to Run the Audit
Plan for about an hour on a normal business site. Take a backup first, because removing a user also asks what to do with their posts, and you want a way back if you choose wrong. Our WordPress backup guide explains how to make one you can trust.
- Make a list of real people. Before you open WordPress, write down everyone who should have access and the role they need. This list is what you will compare against.
- Check the Users screen. Filter by Administrator, then by Editor. Compare each account with your list. Look at the email address too, not only the name.
- Check the database directly. This finds hidden accounts that the Users screen does not show. Many hosts include a tool called WP-CLI, and the command below lists every administrator straight from the database. If your host does not offer WP-CLI, open the users table in phpMyAdmin instead.
wp user list --role=administrator --fields=ID,user_login,user_email,user_registered
- Downgrade before you delete. If you are unsure about an account, change it to Subscriber first. If nobody complains in two weeks, delete it and give its posts to an active user.
- Rename generic usernames. WordPress does not let you change a username in the dashboard, so create a new admin account with a personal name, log in with it and delete the old "admin" account.
- Turn on two-factor login for every admin and editor. Our guide to WordPress two-factor authentication shows how to set it up in a few minutes.
- Add an activity log. A plugin such as WP Activity Log or Simple History records who created users, changed roles or installed plugins. Next time something strange appears, you will have a record instead of guesses.
If you give access to a freelancer or agency for a short job, create a separate account for them with the lowest role that works, and set a date to remove it. Never share your own login.
If You Find an Account That Should Not Be There
Do not just delete it and move on. An unknown administrator usually means someone got in, and they may have left other doors open, such as a backdoor file or a modified plugin.
Write down the account name, email and registration date before you remove it, because these details help you find how it was created. Then change the passwords of all remaining administrators and reset the security keys in wp-config.php, which logs everyone out. After that, update every plugin, because the account was most likely created through a known flaw that an update fixes, as our guide to updating WordPress safely explains.
Finally, scan the site for malware, because hidden admin accounts almost always come with other changes. Our step by step guide to cleaning a hacked WordPress site covers the full process. If you would rather have experts handle it, our WordPress malware removal service cleans the site, closes the entry point and checks your user list as part of the work.
